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by Frederick C. Neff 
Wayne State Un iversity 
Det roit, Michigan 
No special clairv oyance Is required to perceive that 
American education Is presen tly In considerab le disarray. 
The confusion is partly due to piecemeal attempts to 
respond to "ou tside"' or nonprofessional critics, many of 
whom have urged that the schools become more flexible 
In their academic and curriculum requirements, make 
greater provision for individual dlf!erences, promot~ self· 
realization and self-identi ty, nd give greater attention to 
moral and social va lues- in short, that education become 
less rigid and more humane. Equally vocal are those 
critics who would have the schools become primarily pur· 
veyors of skills and knowledge, go "back to basics," in-
stitute stricter scholastic standards, and establish more 
uniform criteria of achievement. Neohumanlsts have 
called for various kinds of al ternative schools, while 
neoconservatives have advocated more discipline and 
greater regimentation within the existing school str uc· 
tu re. 
But there is also a more "'sophisticated" kind of con· 
fusion that emanates from among professional educators 
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themselves who are undecided between conceiving 
education as an art and conceiving It as a science-with 
all the ramifications that such a choice enta ils. To con-
ceive education as an art is to recognize those "non· 
scienti fic" aspects of teaching and learning that have to 
do with theory, aims, norms and Ideals that are continually 
created and reconstructed within the ongoing educational 
enterprise and that do not readily lend themselves to 
quantitative assessment. To conceive education as a 
science is to emphasize the kinds of predictability, unlfor· 
mity and precision In teaching and learn ing that are 
characteristic o f the "exact" sciences. of which physics is 
perhaps the paradigm.' What is overlooked when the 
dilemma is stated in either-or terms is that education may 
be viewed as neither exclusively an art nor exclusively a 
science but .as a combination of both, each contributing 
its proper share. 
It sho uld go without saying that the process of 
education is dependent upon the process of teaching, the 
process of teaching is linked with the process of learning, 
and the process of learning is shaped by the purposes for 
which It is designed. Despite the apparent relatedness of 
these factors, it is nonetheless possible to have been 
taught without being educated and to have learned to no 
purpose. One may, for example, have been taught how lo 
use a screwdriver without for that reason being called 
educated; or one may have learned a mathematical 
theorem that serves no purpose In one's dally life. 
Coalescence of teaching and learning with the ends that 
education is designed to serve precludes artificial 
fragmentation of the educational enterprise and allows for 
i ts being conceived as a whole. It Is when teaching and 
learn ing become divorced from ends that problems arise. 
No tw ithstanding, attention to the nature of learn ing qua 
learning is needed before its relationship to both teaching 
and education can be fully understood. 
I. From Mentallsm to Behaviorism 
During the first two or three decades of this centu ry 
psychol ogy was struggling to shed Its met aphys ical g rb 
in order to become a " true" science. It did not wish to 
remain, as its name Implied, a "science o f mind." The 
classical notion of education as a matter of intellectual 
development or of mind training simply wouldn't do, for 
mentallsm was suggestive of nothing that was amenable 
to empirical investigation. The then·current dictum that 
only what was observable was a fit object of scientific 
sc rutiny led psychologists to abandon pursuit of an 
elusive mind in favor of an almost exclusive concern with 
behavior. Ontological problems of being were dismissed 
by contending that whatever exists at all exists In some 
amount; and if It exists in some amount, It can be 
measured. Recognition that mental states are nearly 
alwa)'S a reflection of bodily states- for example, that eye 
strain can cause a headache, that phys ical fatigue can 
diminish mental alertness, or that a severe blow on the 
head can cause amnesia-prompted psychologists to per· 
ceive that mind and bo<ly are not two separate entities, 
each operating under Its own independent laws, but that 
they function interdependently. Attesting to such 
recognition was the rise of the whole field of 
psychosomatic medicine. Physiological psychology lhus 
began to replace mentalistlc psychology, and the notion 
of a mind·body dualism was on Its way out. In its urgency 
to dispose of all traces of mysticism and metaphysics and 
move toward becoming a "true" science, psychology em· 
braced the thesis that all human behavior was explainable 
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in physiological terms. "The tendency to make 
psychology a study of behavior rather than an in· 
trospectlve analysis of mental states eventual ly made 
considerable headway and became known as 
Behaviorism. 'n 
Instead of being an exclusively mental affair, learning 
was now understood as a process of physiological con-
ditioning. It meant establishing neural connections by 
means of which a particular stimulus became associated 
with a "correct" response. Based upon the find ings of the 
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most cond itioning ex· 
periments were performed on rats, dogs, cats, guinea 
pigs, chicks and pigeons. Although John B. Watson is 
generally credited as being the founder of American 
behaviorism, most pioneer learn ing experiments in this 
field were performed by Edward Lee Thorndike, who set 
forth the thesis that learning was governed primarily by 
the Law of Exercise and the Law of Effect. The Law of 
Exercise accounted for the strengthening of stimulus· 
response (S·R) bonds through repetition; whereas the Law 
of Effect meant that neural connections were 
strengthened when a response was pleasant, weakened 
when it was not. Learning thus became a matter of con· 
ditioning the subject (the learner) to supply whatever 
response the conditioner (the teacher) deemed desirable. 
Mind was either ignored entirely or reduced to synaptic 
connections, and even purposes were regarded as merely 
mechanical. In Thorndike's own words: 
I read the facts which psychologists report about ad· 
justment, configuration, drives, integration, pur· 
poses, tensions and the l ike, and all of these seem to 
me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers 
to Influence the course of thought or feeling or ac· 
lion, to connections and readiness. Learning is con-
necting. The mind is man's connecting system. Pur· 
poses are as mechanical in their nature as anything 
else is! 
Intelligence, insight, understanding, intention and any 
sort of abstract or affective thought were placed in limbo, 
for they were not d irectly observable; while the con· 
ditioned response or the reflex arc, as it came to be called, 
became the matrix of learning. Education thus became a 
matter of conditioning, which in some areas of learning 
amounted to no less than indoctrination, and the schools 
were expected to turn out prespecified products in much 
the same fashion as factories turn out automobiles. 
II. Perception and Meaning 
Behaviorism has undergone certain modifications 
since the days of Watson and Thorndike. Phrases such as 
"positive and negative reinforcement," "operant con· 
ditioning," "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation," "aversive 
stimuli" and the like have been added to its vocabulary. 
What remain, however, are the notions that (1) all behavior 
is specific and identifiable in terms of i ts causal factors; 
(2) human behavior Is essentially no different from 
nonhuman behavior except in degree of complexity; (3) 
human beings, like all other animals, lack freedom; and (4) 
choice Is nonexistent. 
What the behaviorist fai ls to recogn ize is that all 
human acts are whole, and not merely the sum of their 
separate parts. Fragmentation of human acts into their 
sensory stimulus, ideat lonal and response com· 
ponents- although tempting for analytic reasons-is 
both arbitrary and artificial. In so far as human acts are 
joined with and engaged in for a purpose, they are not sim· 
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ply motor responses to stimuli. The act of seeing, for 
example, is all one with purposiveness. The object seen is 
viewed in terms of its meaning, how it is interpreted, the 
purposes for which it may be used. To see is to-see·for·a· 
purpose. Viewing the Grand Canyon may mean for the 
tourist seeing.for-picture·taking purposes; the geologist 
may view it for the purpose of observing the erosive 
processes of nature; while Ferde Grofe's "Grand Canyon 
Suite" may represent i ts meaning to a composer of music. 
No object or set of conditions constitutes a stimulus 
per se. It becomes a stimulus by being caught up in the 
process of ideation and response, of which it is an integral 
part. Stimuli are responses in their incipient stage. Nor are 
responses mere1y to stimu11; ·1ney constitute stimuli trans· 
formed, mediated by the motor phase of the so·called 
reflex arc. Response requires a reconstitution ol stimulus, 
i.e., an assignment or reassignment of meaning. A 
stimulus responded to, acted upon, undergoes trans· 
formation in terms of the interpretation it is given. Nor 
can any object or phenomenon be considered a stimulus 
apart from the eliciting of a response or without a taking 
into account of the peculiar context in which i t appears. A 
sudden, staccato sound is ordinarily perceived as a 
stimulus. It alerts us, it annoys us, it commands our at· 
tent ion. We attempt to locate and identify it, to determine 
whether it is cause for alarm. But if circumstances were 
such that what is ordinarily perceived as a loud noise Is 
obscured by a steady drone of sti ll louder sounds, it is 
unlikely that any observable response or motor activity 
would occur, in which case it would be unwarranted to call 
the noise a stimulus. 
Listening to high· pitched notes being played on a pie· 
co
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might be pleasing to the ear of a f lutist , and so might 
be judged as pleasant. A dog hearing the same high· 
pitched notes responds also, but not with enjoyment. It 
gives indication that the sounds are unpleasant by 
whining or withdrawing. We are wont to say that the 
musician and the dog are responding d iflerently to the 
same stimulus, thus dissociating stimulus from response. 
But is this truly the case? Are the musician and the dog ac· 
tually responding to the "same" stimulus? Or, as In lhe 
first example, is the warrant of calli ng something a 
stimulus contingent upon the presence or absence of a 
response and, as in the second example, is lhe nature of 
the stimulus part and parcel of the nature of both the re· 
sponse and the responder? As Spinoza once observed, 
"One and the same thing can at the same time be good, 
bad and lndiflerent; e.g., music is good to the melancholy, 
bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the 
deaf."• 
if the synergetlc relationship between stimulus and 
response Is still not clearly seen, the question might be 
raised as to where a stimulus ends and where a response 
begins. If no satisfactory answer to this question is 
possible, the only conclusio n to be drawn is that a 
stimulus Is one with its response- just as a cause Is one 
with its eflect and an organ ism Is one with its en· 
vironment. In commenting upon the inadequacy of the 
reflex arc concept, John Dewey has written: 
What we have is a c ircuit; not an arc or broken 
segment of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed 
organic than reflex, because the motor response 
determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory 
stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the 
movement is on ly for the sake of determining the 
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stimulus , of fixing what kind of a stimulus It is, of in-
terpreting It.• 
This Is to say tl\at a stimulus and a response are not 
separate segments of an arc but are reciprocal, each a 
determinant of and determined by the other. Instead of 
representing a llnear progression, they constitute a cir· 
cult. In the language of Dewey: 
The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-
ord ination which represents the conditions which 
have to be met in bringing it to a succ essful issue; 
the response is that phase of one and the same form-
ing co·ordlnation which gives the key to meeting 
these conditions, which serves as Instrument In ef-
fecting the successful co-ordination. They are 
therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous.• 
To suppose that a given stimulus always presumes a 
fi xed response Is to presuppose certainty where un· 
certainty may exist. To be confronted with an uncertain 
response-not to know how to respond-is to be con· 
fronted with an uncertain stimulus-not to know how to 
interpret It. A knock on the door ordinari ly elicit s the 
response of opening It. But if one has had a prior ex· 
~rience of opening the door to an Intruder, both the 
stimulus and the response take on a character of In· 
determinacy. The qual itative nature of both Is in question, 
and a choosing among alternatives is called for. Should 
the knock be Interpreted as that of a friend (Stimulus A), In 
which case the door would likely be opened (Response A); 
or should it be Interpreted as the knock of an intruder 
(Stimulus B), in which case the door would likely be bolted 
(Response B)? Or are still o ther interpretations possible, 
which might call for still o ther kinds of response? As 
Dewey states it: 
Generalized, sensation as stimulus is always that 
phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that 
a co-ordination may be completed. What the sen-
sation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, 
will depend entirely upon the way in which an ac· 
tivity is being directed. It has no fixed quality of Its 
own. The search for the stimulus Is the search for 
exact conditions of action; that Is, for the state of 
things which decides how a beginning CO·Ordinatlon 
should be completed.' 
To the nonplayer or the overly tired, a tennis court, racquet 
and ball are not a stimulus to play tennis; to the non-
smoker, a cigarette Is not a stimulus to smoke; to the 
satiated, food is not a stimulus to eat. " ... what makes 
some physical thing or trait a stimulus Is the cond ition of 
the whole organism at the time, its needs and the kind of 
behavior in which It is already engaged."' 
Ill. Conditioning and Intelligence 
The argument is sometimes advanced that human 
beings and the so·called higher animals have more in com-
mon than they have differences. Indeed, a strong case 
could be made for the contention that the physio logical 
equipment of all mammals Is basically the same. All 
engage in eating, sleeping, locomotion, procreation, living 
and dying. All likewise confront and resolve problems, i.e., 
all are capable of exercising intelligence. Although 
nonhuman forms of animal Ille rely to a considerable ex-
tent upon inherited or genetically programmed behavior 
patterns, commonly referred to as instinct, it cannot be 
said that human behavior Is without its Instinctive com· 
ponent. For present purposes, instinct may be taken to 
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mean those special kinds o f behavior that are not a result 
of learning or reasoning but are native to a specles-e.g., 
the web·buildlng Instinct of spiders, the nest-building in-
stinct of birds or the storing-of.nuts instinct of squirrels. 
The fact that squirrels have been observed to store nuts 
persis tently even In regions where nuts are available the 
year round tends to d iscount the notion that such 
behavior is consciously purposeful or intelligently di -
rected. It is not a result of reasoning or learning but is en-
demic to a species, which is largely what is meant by 
calling it instinctive. The human infant likewise displays 
such Instinctive forms of behavior as crying, reaching 
and grasping, restlessness, yawning, sleeping, etc. The 
homely remark that a baby is a yell at one end and com· 
plate irresponsibility at the other is nonetheless descrip-
tive o f an instinctive rather than a learned behavior pat-
tern . However sophisticated, however subtly or gran-
diloquen tly manifested in adult life through the media of 
art, philosophy, science and religion, it might be main-
tained that most human endeavors are but hig hly refined 
ex tensions of our inborn tendencies to seek pleasure and 
satis faction and to avoid pain and annih ilation. 
The foregoing argument has Its merits, but it also has 
its share of flaws. One of Its merits consists in Its com-
pellingly simplistic explanation of human behavior In terms 
of analogous nonhuman behavior. Its major flaw lies in 
a confounding of the necessary with the sufficient con-
ditions of human behavior. Physiological equipment is a 
necessary requirement for thought, judgment, choice, 
Ideation and the like-just as concrete and steel may be 
necessary requirements for the construction of a building. 
But physiology itself does not constitute thought, any 
more than concrete and steel themselves constitute a 
building. It Is what human beings are capable or doing 
with their physiological equipment that represents their 
distinctiveness, just as what they may have decided to do 
with concrete and steel constitutes the distinctiveness or 
a building. As Psychoanalyst Robert Stroller puts it, 
" Anatomy is not destiny. Destiny is what people make of 
anatomy." Nature furnishes the raw materials, but man 
creates the patterns. The fact that the physiological equip-
ment with which we are born is a necessary condition for 
intelligence Is no guarantee of how or even whether It will 
be exercised. Intelligence is not an autonomous 
possession of human beings which manifests Itself in 
vacuo; nor can it be written off as merely responsive be-
havior to environing situations. What role, then, does in-
telligence play In the behavioristic framework? 
If, in the words of Dewey, "to act wi th an aim Is all one 
with acting Intelligently," It could scarcely be argued that 
to respond to the strongest stimulus is all one with 
responding Intelligently. Lewis Terman once defined in-
tell igence as the ability of an organism to adapt to a new 
sl tuation. In his later years he said that he reg retied having 
used the term " adapt," for It suggested passive response 
Instead of active control. If choice is understood to mean 
dell berate selection of a preferred course of action, and if 
Intelligent choice implies selection on the basis of con-
sidered ends In view, then the absence of choice-making 
ability is tantamount to the absence of Intelligence. To put 
the matter differently, ii by intelligence is meant the abil-
ity to choose dlscriminately among alternative courses 
of action, then to the extent that ability to choose is 
diminished or eliminated altogether, Intelligence Is 
llkewise diminished or eliminated altogether. Whereas 
selective ability-or what Darwin called " natural setec-
EDVCA l'IONA L CONS/Of RATIONS 
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tlon"-is a common trait of all matter and all l ife, at the 
human level such selective ability has been sufficiently 
refined as to warrant the term choice, implying that 
peculiar kind of selectivity that is conscious, deliberate, 
reflective and undertaken for the purpose of realizing a 
foreseeable end. If by conditioning Is meant the 
preprogramming of a response, then it becomes a sub· 
stltute for deliberation, intelligence, and purposiveness. It 
leaves out of account the "inner being" of things and 
deals instead with external relationships only. If not to in· 
teiligence, to what do we resort in coping with situations 
for which we have no preprogrammed response? 
As John Holt has rightly pointed out, "The true test of 
intel ligence is not how much we know how to do, but how 
we behave when we don' t know what to do."' The young 
man who, having read a book on etiquette, began con· 
versatlon with his girl friend by asking, "How's your 
mother and little things like that?" and who started his 
business letters with "Dear Sir or Madam as the Case May 
Be:" may serve as a prime example of rote learning but 
scarcely of intelligence. To suppose that conditioning will 
provide for acting intelligently requires either a 
redefinition of intelligence or acceptance of the premise 
that life presents no uncertainties. Moreover, it is con· 
celvable that persistent conditioning can lead to chronic 
anxiety, flattened emotions, depression and feelings of 
guilt. Men have been conditioned in some cultures to 
believe that weeping in time of sorrow is an unmanly trait 
that should be suppressed. Conditioning an affective 
response deprives it of its genuinely emotional quality and 
substitutes instead only a shallow, overt kind of behavior. 
Joys and sorrows are not merely forms of behavior; rather, 
they are deep-seated emotions that may or may not 
manifest themselves in behavioral terms. Behavior is but 
the tip of the Iceberg we know as self. To regard the tip as 
constituting the whole is to construct a human 
psychology that ignores all but the most trivial and overt 
elements of the nature of man. 
To conceive man as primari ly a responding organism 
is to cast him In a passive role. Such a conception relieves 
him of responsibility for his actions and excuses him tor 
his failures, for he has been victimized by external cir· 
cumstances or genetic endowment- or both. To conceive 
man as capable of exercising initiative casts him in an ac· 
t ive role, responsible for the choices he makes. Both 
classical idealis m and modern existentialism have at· 
tributed to humans a kind of self-sufficiency that per-
mitted them to rise above the exigencies of circumstance. 
in the language of Milton, "The mind is its own place, and 
in itself/Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." The 
human mind was thought to be. autonomous, capable of 
rendering itself immune to external conditions. The power 
of humans through the inescapability of choice to become 
what they will them selves to be is echoed by Jean-Paul 
Sartre: 
If man, as the existential ist conceives him, is In· 
definable, It is because at first he is nothing. Only al· 
terward will he be something, and he himself will 
have made what he will be .... Not only is man what 
he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what 
he wills himself to be after this thrust toward 
existence. 10 
"Condemned to be free," man is at every turn of his life 
confronted with choice, without which he Is nothing. Such 
is the nature of the human predicament. Man becomes 
human at that point in his life when he realizes that from 
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the burden of choosing, there is no escape. Whereas 
classical idealism and modern existentialism have con-
ceived humans as largely self-determined and self. 
directed, behaviorism views them as other-determined 
and other-directed. What we are accustomed to call 
selfhood is nonexistent. Since there is no self as such, it 
becomes nonsense to speak of self-realization, self· 
actualization, self-fulfilment, or self-control. What we are 
offered instead is a kind of mechanism that responds to 
extraneous factors, i.e., to causes outside our control. The 
self, in short, cannot act, for it is capable only of reac-
tion-if, indeed, there be any such entity as self at ail. 
IV. Was Dewey a Behaviorist? 
It was stated earlier that much of the present con-
fusion in education is traceable to indecision as to 
whether education shou id be conceived as an art or as a 
science-or as both. The argument might even be ad· 
vanced that science itself is an art In the sense that it is an 
artifact, i.e., a humanly devised, created or contrived 
means for dealing with phenomena. Matters of ethics and 
morality would certainly fall within the rubric of art so 
defined, for they represent human constructs rather than 
raw data. If by art is meant the whole ga'mut of human 
creations as distinguished from what exists in the natural 
world apart from human intervention, the argument takes 
on a semblance of plausibility. The so-called social sciences 
in general and psychology in particular might then be 
viewed from a different perspective and seen in a different 
light. Obsession with measurement and quantification 
might give way to concern for seeing life whole. II Is 
recounted that Dewey, once found with a copy of the 
Psychological Review in his hands, threw it down, ex-
claiming, " I despair of psychologists ! They have no un-
derstanding of what science is. They think it has to do 
v1ith measuring and countlng."11 
To De"fey and other pragmatists, to be scientific in 
the true sense of the term Is to be critical-minded, and 
critical mindedness is not limited to physical concerns 
but applies across the board. They viewed the tem1 science 
in broader perspective than those who fail to see the 
woods for the trees, i.e., whose preoccupation with bits 
and pieces of knowledge prevents them from seeing life 
whole. Both Dewey and present-day behaviorists have 
rejected mentalism, or what Gilbert Ryle has called "the 
myth of the dogma of the ghost in the machine." 
Piecemeal and out·of-context reading of Dewey might 
even suggest that he embraced behaviorism, as when he 
\vrote: 
... instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of 
thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is 
literally something which we do; that analysis is 
ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their 
logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and 
methods of behaving toward facts, and that active 
experimentation is essential to verification.,,. 
Context aside, does the above passage qualify Dewey as a 
behaviorist? The answer is that Dewey was a behaviorist 
In the sense that he rejected the notion of thought as an 
arcane process of noesis with no necessary issue in con· 
duct, for he held that the whole purpose of thinking is to 
provide warrant for a given course of action. Behaving or 
acting he regarded as proving grounds for hypotheses. 
Behavior Is not an end in itself but a means for testing the 
adequacy of a formulated course of action, for deter· 
mining the justification of a theory by observing how It 
5 
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works out in practice. Dewey was not a behaviorist to the 
extent that he joined theory with practice, thought with ac· 
lion. thus obviating any need for viewing reflection in 
Isolation from behavior or behavior apart from reflection. 
Whereas behaviorism has little concern for reflection to 
Dewey reflection was viewed as the indispensable me~ns 
for rendering action intefligent and purposeful, thus 
preventing II from becoming random, accidental or blind· 
while action was seen as intelligent and purposeful only 
as It represented a consummation of thought. 
V. Some Caveats re Social Engineering 
Both behaviorism and pragmatism reject the notion 
of absolute human autonomy, i.e., the Idea that human 
beings have some kind of inner will that enables them to 
cu l themselves ott trom environing circumstances or past 
experience and to act in vacuo. There is a difference, 
however, between rejecting absolute autonomy and 
recognizing a degree of autonomy that provides tor the 
exercise of intelligence in circumstances that are highly 
Indeterminate and hence unpredictable in their outcomes. 
Sul whereas In the writings of Dewey the role o f in· 
telligence is nearly everywhere paramount, it Is significant 
to note that virtually no mention Is made of intelligence in 
the writings of the behaviorists. To Dewey, the learner is 
brought to maturity through the cultivation of critical 
social Intelligence. Every conception of the good 1~ 
ultimately social, which is to say that it has to do with how 
we conduct ourselves in reference not simply to our own 
individual or selfish desires but to the general or social 
welfare; this, in turn, creates conditions whereby in· 
div ldual freedoms may be more fully realized. This is to 
say that an Individual is no more or less free than the 
society in which he lives either restricts or protects his 
ability to exercise choice. Dewey likewise believed that 
scientific inquiry itself is a basically moral and social un· 
dertaking and therefore laden with moral and social 
obligations. 
Except in a strictly biological sense, human nature Is 
not given at birth; rather, it consists of those specific 
trails of character that have been deliberately cultivated 
through the medium of education. Human beings at birth 
are predisposed to act neither morally nor Immorally. 
Moral conduct is learned rather than innate, and it Is 
socially oriented rather than privately intuited. Nor Is that 
kind of behavior that has been conditioned or In-
doctrinated in accordance with some set ot rules govern· 
Ing "propriety" worthy of being labeled mor al, for It lacks 
the undergirdi ng of re flective accountability. In Dewey's 
thought moral intelligence is neither reifled nor auton· 
omlzed. Rather than referring to a person as having, 
owning, or possessing intelligence, Dewey prefers to 
speak of an individual as conducting himself Intelligently. 
Use of the adverbial form prevents viewing intelligence as 
a thing or entity possessed and shifts the emphasis to Its 
practical Issue, i.e., lo its consequences in action. 
Behaviorist B.F. Skinner, on the other hand ap· 
parently rejects intelligence as an avenue to the good life. 
Distinctions between gOOd and evil are to be accounted 
for In terms of positive and negative reinforcement. 
Whatever reinforces us positivety-i.e., elicits a pleasant 
response-is good, moral and right; whatever reinforces 
us negatively-1.e., elicits an unpleasan t response-is 
bad, Immoral and wrong. The survival of good over evil is 
thus gua~anteed in the scheme of things, for, according to 
Skinner, 11 Is our "nature" to seek positive reinforcements 
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and to avoid negative ones." This sounds as though it Is 
"na.turat" for human beings to seek what is good and to 
avood what 1s evil. Reminiscent of the romantic naturalism 
of Rousseau, it Implies some sort of built-in mechanism 
instinctive moral sense, or Kantian " immanence" thai 
enables man to select positive reinforcements and to 
avoid negative ones-the very thing that behaviorists have 
elsewhere denied in claiming that all behavior is con· 
ditioned behavior. Moreover, it fails to note that many ex-
periences may be satisfying that are not at all mo ral, nd 
that many others may be unpleasant that are not for that 
reason evil. Acts of brutality may be gratifying to those ol 
sadistic inclination, but are they for that reason good? 
Acts of setf·sacrifice and deprivation may be unpleasant 
because of the hardships they entail, but are they for such 
reason bad? As Max Wingo states it, " If we grant ... that 
goods are positive reinforcers : .. how do we know that 
those things that reinforce us positively are really 
good-that 1s, that they are desirable and worthy of being 
prized and sought after?'" ' The ultimate criterion that 
Skinner employs in determining the worth of a culture is 
survival. A culture survives to the extent that control is 
exercised over the behavior ol Its members." In view of 
the fact that few social orders can be cited wherein 
greater control was exercised over the behavior or their 
members than that which prevailed during the Nazi 
regime, this appears to be a rather odd contention. 
Perhaps Skinner had best confine his efforts to ex-
periments with rats and pigeons. When he undertakes to 
pl~y social engineer, he is venturing into a domain that Is 
ahen to nonhuman animals, viz., culture. His social 
utopias convey no profound recognition of what Unamuno 
has called "the tragic sense of life," but appear to be spun 
out of a cotton.candy kind of euphoria. Nor can his 
utopias in any way be regarded as guaranteed outcomes 
of the methods he employs; Indeed, identical methods 
can be and have been used to produce and maintain 
human bondage. The notion that only "good" cultures sur· 
vive-that is, that survival Is the test for the worth of a 
culture- is belied by the fact that tyrannical monarchies 
oligarchies and other forms of predemocratic soctai 
arrangement have a far longer history of survival than does 
democracy. The power of chol~e which democracy prizes 
has always been understood as ability to select freely 
amon~ alternatives and to act accordingly. Only in 
sotuatoons where no alternative exists is choice denied as 
i~ ~he drudging 1.ife of the slave or the strictured living c'on-
d1toon
s 
o.f the prisoner, for such Jives require no more than 
conformity to rules already laid down. At authoritarian 
political levels what In simple psychological terms has 
been called stimulus becomes the prod of brute force, and 
response be.comes submission to the whip of authority. 
Although Skinner carefully avoids reference to tyranny in 
rejecting all semblances of human autonomy, what 
0
he 
substitutes are external controls as formulated by 
"enlightened" social engineers-which amounts to a 
euphemistic phrasing of authoritarianism. That such a 
view is sharply at odds with a fundamental precept of 
democracy is illustrated in the following passage from 
Dewey: 
Since a democratic society repudiates the principle 
of external authority, It must find a substitute in 
voluntary disposition and interest; these can be 
created only by education. But there is a deeper ex-
planation. A democracy Is more than a fonm of govern-
ment; It is primarily a mode of associated living, of 
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conjoint communicated experience. The extension 
in space of the number of individuals who par· 
tlcipate in an interest so that each has to refer his 
own action to that of others, and to consider the ac· 
lion of others to give point and direction to his own, 
is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers 
of class, race and national territory which kept men 
from perceiving the full import of their activity.•• 
VI. "The Hypothesis That Man Is Not Free ... " 
Frequently overlooked in discussions of Skinner's 
brand of behaviorism is a key premise upon the warrant of 
which much of his psychological structure stands or falls. 
He states it as follows: "The hypothesis that man is not 
free is essential to the application of scientific method to 
the study of human behavior."" In the first place, it should 
be noted that this is a hypothesis, an assumption without 
proof, a provisional or suppositional statement, 
verification of which has never been established. In the 
second place, the assertion begs the question, for it 
requires us to assume the warrant of a statement that is it· 
self open to question, viz., that scientific method is ap-
plicable to a study of human behavior only If It is first 
hypothesized that human beings are not free. This is 
equivalent to holding that scientific study is not only ham· 
pered but impossible where the object studied behaves 
unpredictably, thus violating humanly formulated laws 
governing its behavior. In the third place, despite in-
clusion of the word scientific, the statement Itself is 
patently unscientific, for it flies in the face of a major 
requirement of all scientific propositions, viz. , that they be 
in fact or in principle testable. Untestable hypotheses for 
this reason cannot be viewed as truly scientific. In the 
fourth place, application of scientific method to a study of 
human or any other kind of behavior would begin, not with 
a prejudgment-in this case, that human beings are not 
free- but with impartial inquiry. Indeed, not to do so 
would be the antithesis of scientific method. In the fifth 
place, the assertion is covertly prescriptive in its claim 
that the hypothesis must be accepted ("is essential'') 
before study of human behavior can be undertaken, and so 
is hortatory rather than descriptive. It shows, to 
paraphrase Bertrand Russell , that the worse your premise, 
the more curious the conclusions to which it gives rise. 
If human beings were not free to act in unanticipated 
ways, their behavior would of course more easily lend it· 
self to study and prediction. What Skinner may be thinking 
is-to phrase it In the vernacular-that accepting the 
hypothesis that man is not free would make the study of 
human behavior a helluva lot easier. " Sit still! Don't 
move!" the professional photographer often says to his 
subject, meaning that the photograph wl II be clearer if the 
subject engages In no unpredictable movements. The por-
trait painter makes a similar request of his subject. This is 
suggestive of Michael Scriven 's remark that "the 
logician's perennial temptation is to make the portrait 
neat and perhaps the sitter will become neat."" Just as it 
is easier to take aim at a non moving target, so it is simpler 
to study an object that "stays put." Whether it is of the 
nature of the object to stay put is conveniently Ignored. In-
stead of beginning with disinterested inquiry Into human 
behavior, we are asked to begin with an assumption about 
human nature that is not only unsupported by the evi· 
dence but, indeed, is denied by it. Even so exact a science 
as physics recognizes the indeterminacy of atomic par-
ticles, to say nothing of the questionableness of the 
FJ\Ll , 1976 
cause-effect principle as an adequate explanation of 
natural phenomena. Moreover, theorizing about human 
nature is a different undertaking from studying human 
behavior and, if engaged in on a scientific basis, would 
properly follow rather than precede the latter. 
Only a wholly static universe would be entirely pre· 
dictable. Hence, predictability is related not only to sim· 
plicity and mechanism but also to fixity, not to mention its 
reliance upon an outmoded physics. If, as Wil liam James 
once observed, ours is "a universe with the lid off," i f 
universal processes are charged with novelty and 
burgeoning with change, if life is an ongoing and dynamic 
affair, if novelty Is in the scheme of things and not merely 
superimposed upon it, then a radically different approach 
to a study of human nature and life processes Is called for. 
Mechanism needs to be supplanted by field theory, and 
prejudicial hypotheses by inquiry. To hold that It is essen· 
tial that we begin a study of human behavior by 
hypothesizing that human beings lack freedom is 
equivalent to assuming without question that they have 
no ability to engage in acts of choice. Since the only kinds 
of choice that deserve the name are those that are freely 
undertaken, choice is essential to democracy, for the 
ability to choose without undue restraint and to act ac· 
cordingly is precisely what is meant by freedom. 
If there is to be a science of human behavior-and If It 
is to be truly a science and not merely an 
apologetics-then it is obligated to divest itself of Its 
biased premises in order to become descriptive, objective 
and impartial. Inquiry into the nature of human behavior 
will need to displace " the hypothesis that man is not 
free," for the former is open-ended, whereas the latter 
begs the question. The question, "Is man free to behave in 
unpredictable ways?" Is thus bypassed; and the 
hypothesis remains undisturbed. This is not unlike saying 
that the hypothesis that ghosts exist is essential to 
studying their behavior, thus circumventing any question 
as to their actual existence. To begin with the hypothesis 
that man is not free demands corollary acceptance of 
human beings as capable of no more than responsive 
behavior- as devoid of choice, as deprived of any kind of 
self-control, and as essentially no different from 
nonhumans. Yet, even a trapped animal struggles to be 
free, just as animals in captivity are restricted in what they 
are free to do. As the noted prlmatologist Scott Lindbergh 
has observed: ' 'Monkeys in zoos are like convicts. They 
have no choice in anything. And choice is essential to 
keep intelligence alive. Animals are like people. They need 
to be able to do things for themselves." To say that man's 
most prized possession is freedom may be to use 
figurative language. But it may be worth noting that such 
an assertion is more often made with greater fervor and 
understanding of its import by those who have ex· 
perienced bondage than by those who have never been en-
slaved. 
VII. Concerning Poets, Women, and Hens 
Are human beings responsible for what they do? 
What role does the self play in determining human con· 
duct? Or are all human acts prompted by forces ex· 
traneous to themselves, and is the term self merely a 
metaphor? We shall examine these questions in greater 
detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this poi~t that 
to embrace behaviorism is to accept the thesis that 
selfhood is nonexistent. What we are accustomed to 
calling self is simply genetic endowment plus conditioning 
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and has no e.xlstence of its own. Human beings are thus 
relieved of assuming any moral obligation for what they 
do, for instead of having chosen to do this or that, their 
behavior has resulted from factors over which they had no 
control. Neither saints nor sinners are responsible for 
their actions; hence moral acts are no more deserving of 
praise than are criminal acts deserving of condemnation. 
Nor are artistic accomplishments any more suitable Ob· 
jects of admiration than are diabolica l schemes flt objects 
of scorn. According to Skinner, " having" a poem, for 
example, is essentially no different from "having" a baby. 
Nor is it any different from a hen laying an egg. In each 
case it is simply descriptive of a natural phenomenon for 
which neither the pregnant woman, nor the "pregnant" 
poet, nor the laying hen is primarily responsible. The poet 
Is no more deserving of acclaim for having written his 
poem than is the woman for having had her baby or the 
hen for having laid its egg. "Writing a poem," says Skin· 
ner, "is the sort of thing men and women do as men and 
women, having a baby is the sort of thing a woman does as 
a woman, and laying an egg is the sort of thing a hen does 
as a hen." We are able to discover the causes of our ac-
tions " by analyzing the genetic and individual histories 
responsible for our behavior .... "'' 
But suppose we were to choose a different cast of 
characters without altering one whit Skinner's line of 
reasoning. Suppose we were to say that committing 
crimes is the short of thing men and women do as men 
and women, becoming a prostitute is the sort of thing a 
woman does as a woman, and stalking prey is the sort of 
thing a wild animal does as a wild animal. And suppose we 
were to add that, just as the poet had no responslblllly for 
writing his poem, neither can criminals or prostitutes be 
held accountable for their criminal acts or prostitution. In 
the case of the wild animal, Skinner's explanation will suf-
fice. But this Is precisely the point. The wild animal 
behaves as It does because it cannot behave otherwise; 
accordingly, It would be foolish either to praise or to 
blame it. It lacks developed powers of reflection, It lacks 
moral sensibility, it lacks ability to choose one course of 
action over another-and so condemning its behavior 
would be like condemning a tornado for its destructive 
force. Having committed the genetic fallacy, Skinner then 
proceeds to commit the fallacy of overgeneralization. To 
suppose that because man is an animal he is therefore 
nothing but an animal is to commit what the geneticist Sir 
Julian Huxley has called "the nothing-but fallacy," which 
results from an equation of all human traits with 
nonhuman animal traits. What we are being asked to ac-
cept is that, since nonhuman animals (or, to use Skinner's 
example, hens) are not responsible for what they do, 
therefore human beings are equally nonresponslble for 
what they do. The flaw in thi s sort of reasoning might 
become more apparent i f the argument were reversed, 
resulting in the conclusion that, since human beings are 
responsible for their actions, therefore nonhumans are 
equally responsible, in which case a sow could be 
arrested and brought to trial for the crime of devouring her 
young. One argument has about the same amount of 
credibility as the o ther-which Isn't much. 
Arguments against the thesis that human beings are 
absolutely autonomous in all their thoughts and actions 
constitute child's play. No philosophic profundity is 
required to rec~nize that we are at all times engaged in 
interaction with some kind of environment-be it 
physical, psychological, religious, cultural, social or 
6 
whatever-and that previous experience plays a 
significant role in shaping present and future behavior. 
But It is one thing to acknowledge that prior experience Is 
taken into account, Is influential, becomes a contributing 
factor. or has a bearing in respect to our behavior, and 
quite another to hold that it predetermines our behavior. In 
rejecting human autonomy, what behaviorists do, in el· 
lect, is to substitute environmental autonomy. By casting 
the human being in a passive role of responder, they cast 
the environment (plus genetic history) in an active ro le o f 
controller , overlooking the fact that abject submission on 
the part of one or autonomous control on the part of the 
other is virtually never the case. 
If we were to fall from an airplane without a parachute 
at a height of 16,000 feet, we would likely have lost control 
of our destiny, and the environmental field might be said 
to have taken over almost completely. In times of 
catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and strikes 
of lightning, our powers of choice are temporari ly 
minimized; and we are said to be at the mercy of the 
elements. But such Instances are comparatively rare; they 
are lar outnumbered by examples of man's ability to con· 
tr
ol 
the conditions under which he lives. Each time an 
engineer constructs a dam, each time a physician In· 
tervenes in the natural course of a disease, each time new 
and better means of communication and transportation 
are devised, human beings are playing an active role in 
shaping and controlling their environments. 
The concert artist who holds an audience enthralled, 
the conductor whose every gesture conveys subtle nu· 
ances of interpretation to an orchestra, the writer whose 
literary genius captivates the reader, the actor or actress 
whose performance is acclaimed as brilliant-all are 
likewise in control of what they are doing, all are shaping 
and creating a special kind of environment. In such latter 
instances, the argument is not that they are absolutely 
autonomous, for they must enl ist the co-operation of fac-
tors other than themselves. But they are nevertheless 
exercising a significant degree of autonomy in that they 
are creating, inventing, or bringing Into being a different 
set of conditions than would otherwise prevail. Human 
beings both act upon and respond to their environments. 
The relationship between Individuals and their en-
vironments is transactional rather than unilateral. In tact, 
it Is this peculiar ability of humans to conceive and to ac· 
tuallze modifications of their environments that con· 
stltu
tes 
their uniqueness as human beings and thus 
distinguishes them from other species. 
VIII. The Concept of Self hood 
Throughout our discussion the role that self plays In 
this transactional process still remains clouded, perhaps 
for the reason that the terms self and selfh ood have yet to 
be clearly defined. Behaviorism would of course reject the 
notion of selfhood, just as it would discount the existence 
of free will. Rejection of such terms as existences or en-
tities, however, is not equivalent to their rejection as con-
cepts. Behaviorism Itself is a concept In the sense that it 
cannot be pointed to as "existing" anywhere. Not-
withstanding, little is gained by dogmatically maintaining 
that the self exists or that human beings have lree will, 
and letting It go at that, without bothering to clarify what Is 
meant when such assertions are made. What, then, does It 
mean to say that the self exists? To exist is, in familiar 
terms, to have weight and occupy space. Obviously, the 
self cannot be so classified. To say that to exist means to 
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have temporal-spatial d imensions doesn't help much 
either, for this wou ld require that the self be locatab le in 
time and space. The edge that the behaviorists have on 
those who understand the self to exist in some 
autonomous sense is that the notion of a hypostatized 
self is scienti fically Indefensible. And so the behaviorist 
confronts us with decid ing between discarding the self as 
a discredited entity under the guise of scientific rigor, and 
holding on to it in the name of some sor1 of metaphysics. 
The fact is that we are not obligated to sett le for ei ther of 
these alternatives. 
Just as water is not simply two· parts of hydrogen and 
one of oxygen but is a liquid exhibiting properties quite 
different from either of its constituent elements . just as a 
child evinces qualities quite different from those of the 
parents who produced him, so the self displays traits of its 
own that are appreciably di fferent from whatever forces 
may have contributed to Its creation. The emergence of 
consciousness, moreover, suggests degrees of self· 
awareness and powers of introspection that neither genes 
nor conditioning can account for. What is called self 
emerges from the act ive interplay of human organisms 
with their environmental f ields, and especially from the in-
teraction of human beings with their distinctively social 
environments. Self is neither a thing or entity possessed 
nor a mere metaphor; It is an emergent function, descrip · 
tive of the various ways in which humans both respond to 
and control the ambient fields in which they live, move, 
and have their being. Accordingly, self may be defined as 
a conceptual term denoting an individual's peculiar 
awareness of his own existence in relation to the world 
about him, and especially of those unique traits that set 
him apart from others. 
Similarly, free will is not an entity or metaphysical 
substance; nor is it autonomous in the sense that it exists 
in isolation from contextual circumstances. It is simply an 
ill-chosen term that needs to be redefined as the power to 
choose without unwarranted restraint from among com-
peting alternatives. Since no choice deserves the name 
that is not freely undertaken, it carries with it the burden 
of moral responsibil ity for the consequences to which it 
may lead. The fact that nonhuman anim als give no in-
dication of acting in any moral sense but behave on the 
basis of Instinct, habituat ion, or condi tioni ng 
necessitates the conc lusion that morality is a uniquely 
human construct. Nor can any human act be dignified as 
moral except as It Is an outgrowth of reflection, intention 
and consideration of the desirability of all its probable 
consequences. 
IX. The ls-Ought Dichotomy-A Backward Look 
Two final considerations are in order. The first has to 
do with an attempt to clarify the relationship between 
statements of fact and statements of value; the second 
concerns a neglected but much-needed distinction be· 
tween generic behavior and human conduct. Pace David 
Hume and latter-day British empiricists and ph ilosophic 
analysts, it has become fashionable to regard empirical 
assertions and valuational assertions as constituting 
separate universes of discourse-commonly referred to 
as the is-ought dichotomy. According to this view, factual 
(or synthetic) statements consist of assertions that can be 
empirically verified; furthermore, on ly empirically 
verifiable assertions may be considered to be 
propositions. The assertion, for example, "It Is raining 
today" is factually true in so far as evidence can be cited 
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in support of it, in so far as what constitutes evidence can 
be agreed upon, and in so far as the evidence is public ly 
demonstrable. When such conditions are met, the 
proposi t ion would then "compel the assent" of any im· 
partial observer, i.e., it may be said to be true. A more 
technical assertion, like "E ~ MC2," would need to meet 
the same criteria, with the understanding, of course, that 
evidence in this case might be quasi-mathematical, and 
that "publicly demonstrable" would no doubt refer to its 
demonstrability to a community of Qualified physicists. In 
neither case, however, could such propositions be judged 
as true on any such basis as intuition, feeling or any other 
sort of nonempirical "authority." 
The corollary of this view is that statements of value 
are of an entirely di fferent order and are traceable to 
emotion rather than rooted in fact. They are regarded as 
•·veiled imperatival utterances," which is to say that they 
are either direct or indirect exhortations to action. "Close 
the window" is an obvious exhortation to act in a specific 
way, and so is neither true nor false. Sentences couched 
in the indicative mood may pass as assertions of fact; but 
if they conceal a value, an "ought," or an imperative, they 
are said to be removed from the category of the synthetic. 
The judgmental assertion, "The welfare system of this 
country is in need of reform," appears superficially to be a 
statement of fact It is phrased in the indicative mood. It 
omits the word " ought " and seems to be an observation of 
fact, of a particular state of affairs. But what is actually 
being asserted, It may be argued, Is not a fact but a 
feeling. What the assert ion really says is, " I feel that the 
welfare system needs to be reformed," or, "The welfare 
system ought to be reformed, " or, more directly, "Reform 
the welfare system!" 
The judgmental assertion about the welfare system 
is, like all other judgments, reduced to no more than an e*· 
pression of emot ion. So conceived, truth assertions 
(proposi tions) are regarded as scientific and testable, 
while judgmental asserlions (valuations) are regarded as 
emotive and untestable-and never the twain shall meet. 
In the words of A.J . Ayer: " . .. since the expression of a 
value judgement is not a proposition, the question of truth 
or falsehood does not here arise.'• . .. exhortations to 
moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or 
commands which are designed to provoke ... action of a 
certain sort. Accordingly, they do not belong to any 
branch of philosophy or science. As for expressions of 
ethical judgements, we have not yet determined how they 
should be classified." " 
If philosophy differs from science In any cogent way, 
the difference lies In recognition of science as largely 
descriptive and phenomenological and of phl.losophy as 
Interpretive and judgmental. The phi losop her is, as it 
were, an Impressionist ; while the scientist Is a 
photographer. Alt hough appropriate distinctions may be 
made, the mistake commonly made is to presume a gap or 
disparity between these two domains instead of viewing 
them as complementary. "How satisfying," says Mr. 
Gradgrind in Dickens' Hard Times, " Is the possession ol 
fact, which does away with any mystery surrounding our 
daily life!"-forgetting that to know all facts and possess 
no feelings is not to live at al l. What does it mean? Is 
everywhere the paramount question, for no factual or 
descriptive statement has any significance except as It is 
interpreted in some way or assigned some kind of 
meaning. An out-of-context fact-i.e., a fact devoid of its 
bearing upon human intE1rests and human concerns-ls 
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utterly meaningless. Thus, the assertion that Sanskrit was 
the ancient Aryan language of the Hindus of India, despite 
Its factual accuracy, is infinitely less meaningful than that 
a close friend or relative has been seriously injured in an 
accident. 
Like the stlmulus of our earlier discussion, a lact has 
no intrinsic meaning. It assumes meaning when we judge 
or interpret It in some manner, value or devalue it, assign 
importance or unimportance to it, react to it in a particular 
way-which is to say that facts are what they mean. To 
speak of a value-fr ee fact is to speak of a fact with no utter 
signi ficance, for meaning consists In what Dewey has 
called "the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains. " The 
assertion " It Is raining today" is understood in terms of 
what it means as distinguished from what It merely in· 
forms. It may mean that a proposed picnic will have to be 
canceled, or that crops will now have a better chance of 
surviving, or that an intended visit will need to be post· 
poned, or any of countless other things, each of which is 
likely to be fraught with pleasure or frustration. Even so 
apparently dispassionate an assertion as " E = MC2" is 
modified and takes on meaning by virtue of its affective 
content. It may simply mean that mass and energy are in· 
terconvertible and summon visions of the benefits to be 
derived from nuclear fission. Or it may symbolize the 
atomic bomb, mushroom clouds, and the tragedy of 
Hiroshima, and cause us to recoil in horror. All of this is 
another way of saying that the moral, judgmental or 
valuational content of propositions is not something 
apart; on the contrary, it is precisely what endows them 
with meaning, without which they have no value or 
significance. 
Equall y indefensible is the notion that valuational 
assertions are unrooted in or somehow disconnected 
from any empirically verifiable context, or that they in 
some way transcend experienoe. Judgments are properly 
rendered and valuations properly made only by taking into 
account existing situations, i.e., facts. What ought to be 
done in a particular circumstance depends upon what is 
the case. "Ought" assertions are thus subject to criticism 
as to their warrant in much the same way as are synthetic 
assertions. To say, for example, that a street ought to be 
paved would be warranted only If the facts indicated that 
its present condition was unsatisfactory, that it had 
chuckholes that interfered with safe driving, thal It had a 
heavy flow of trartlc, etc. To say that a greater abundance 
o f food is needed In a given area wou Id be warranted only 
If the facts indicated that the particular area referred to 
was in short supply of food. That certain things are prized, 
valued and revered and that others are scorned, devalued 
and condemned Is not only itself a fact but it is derived 
from fact, i.e., It Is warranted by knowledge. Clean air is 
prized because of the fact that It Is conducive to health, 
while pollution Is condemned because it is known to con· 
tribute to respiratory disease. The growing of vegetables 
is valued because of the fact that their consumption is 
necessary to a balanced diet, while malaria-carrying 
mosquitoes are decried because they are known 10 be 
harmful to health . 
The traditlonal argument that an "ought " assertion is 
not deducible from an "is" assertion will no longer suf· 
lice, not because It is invalid but because it substitutes 
"slide-rule" logic for fruitful inquiry. It represents a 
holdover from an obsolescent syllogistic or Aristotelian 
sort of reasoning which is rooted not in human experience 
and human alfalrs but in not much more than esoteric in· 
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tellection . To argue that there Is utterly no relationship 
between what is true and what Is va lued is not only un· 
w<1rranted but untenable. As Dewey has observed, "The 
notion that valuations do not exist In empirical fact and 
that therefore value·conceptions have to be imported from 
a source outside experience is one ol the most curious 
beliefs the mind of man has ever entertained."" He goes 
on to say that 
.. . at the present time the widest gap In knowledge 
Is that which exists between humanistic and non· 
humanistic subjects. The breach will disappear, the 
gap be filled and science be manifest as an 
operating unity in fact and not merely in idea when 
the conclusions of impersonal non-humanistic 
science are employed in guiding the course of 
distinctively human behavior, that, namely, which is 
influenced by emotion and desire in the framing o f 
means and ends; for desire, having ends-in-view, and 
hence involving valuations, is the characteristic that 
marks off human from nonhuman behavior. On the 
other side, the science that Is put to distinctively 
human use is that In which warranted ideas about 
the nonhuman world are integrated with emotion as 
human traits. In this integration not only is science 
Itself a value (since it is the expression and 
fulfillment of a special human desire and interest) 
but it is the supreme means of the valid deter· 
mination of all valuations in all aspects of human 
and social life." 
Joining of the factual with the valualional is not 
without its educational import. Alt hough it may be argued 
that how learning occurs is a factual question, and that 
what is valued is a philosophic one, the two become lnex· 
tricably interwoven when it is recognized that what is 
learned and how it is learned assume significance only in 
terms of ends or purposes. Of what value is such-and·such a 
learning? thus overrides the question of how a partlcular 
kind of learning occurs or how it is best facilitated. Ex· 
perlmentatlon concerning the nature of the learning 
process may yield the conclusion that, given a certain 
organism and a specific set of environing conditions, this 
is the way !earning occurs. But such an assertion leaves 
untouched the larger question of whether a designated 
learning device ought to be used, or whether what is 
learned by means of it ought to be lea rned at all. It is 
becoming ever more apparent that an ls-ought dualism is 
both tenuous and stultifying, suggesting as it does that a 
fact need have no relevance to value and that a value need 
have no referent In fact. Dissolution of such a dichotomy 
would bring about recognition of the scientific and the 
valuatlonal as reciprocal rather than as disparate 
categories. It wou ld join science of learning with 
philosophy of educaticn In common cause by utilizing the 
kno wledge that research supplies toward a real ization of 
ends that are individually and socially defensible. It might 
even provide for the emergence of some sort of 
wholeness or coordinating principle that may enable us to 
regain our educatio nal perspective. 
X. Generic Behavior and Human Conduct-A Needed 
Distinction 
It is commonplace that everyth ing that exists Is in 
some sense unique. No two atoms, no two flowers, no two 
snowflakes, no two sunsets, no two twins are precisely 
ldentlcal. In the animal kingdom It Is the uniQue charac· 
terlstlcs that various organisms exhibit that enable us to 
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Identify them as belonging to a certain species, not· 
withstanding the fact that they may share many traits in 
common with other species. By contrast, to say that every 
form of life and matter engages in some sort of behavior, 
or that behavior characterizes all that exists, Is a loosely 
grandiose rather than a sharply definit ive assertion, tor It 
fails to account for any uniqueness among the entitles to 
which it Is applied. So used, the term behavior Is all· 
encompassing, ranging aft the way from the actions of 
subatomic particles to those of galaxies, from the actions 
of amoebae to those of human beings. What Is probably 
being taken Into account in asserting that all thing s 
behave Is that movement of some sort Is everywhere 
present - be It the slow progression of a glac ier or the 
speed of light. When the term behavior is thus used, no 
distinction Is made between behavior that Is a result of an 
object's being acted upon (as the case of a glacier) and 
behavior that Is self-initiated (as in the case of human 
beings). Such a view tails 10 differentiate between reactive 
and creative behavior. If, in reply to asking what does not 
behave, we are told that nothing exists that does not 
behave, then the term behavior ceases to have any 
defini t ive meaning, tor it cannot be distinguished from 
nonbehavlor. By way of analogy, if everything were wet, 
dry would have no meaning; or, if there were no darkness, 
light would have no meaning. Terms have meaning and 
thus are definitive only as they can be differentiated from 
other terms. 
Does this imply that the term behavior should be 
restricted to nonhuman forms of l ife and matter and that It 
Is Inapplicable to human beings? Does it mean that human 
beings do not behave? Does It discount the validity o l a 
science of human behavior? Not at all. Human beings, 
along with all other living organisms and physical entitles, 
do act In ways that may properly be termed behavioral, If 
for no other reason than that they engage in movement. 
But whereas all engage in movement, and whereas many 
human activities may constitute no more than movement, 
all such activities fall within the rubric of noninitlated or 
responsive behavior. In response to nutrients in the soil, 
rainfall , and conducive temperatures, a plant grows and 
blooms; in response to proper training, a dog obeys Its 
master; as a result of the pressing of certain keys, a 
typewriter responds by producing typewri tten words and 
sentences; in noticing the changing of a traffic light from 
green to red, a motorist responds by applying the brakes 
of a car. All such behavior is responsive, and responsive 
behavior Is as characteristic of human beings as ii Is of 
nonhumans. But ii will scarcely do to conclude that 
because human beings engage in responsive kinds of 
behavior, therefore all human behavior Is responsive, I.e., 
that human behavior Is Identifiable in no other sense. This 
would be like saying that because machinery Is used In 
the manufacture of automobiles, therefore all machinery 
is so used and Is Identifiable in no other sense. 
Nol long ago arguments about such Issues as tree 
will vs. determinism and heredity vs. environment 
dominated the educational scene. The unexamined 
assumption that exclusive attachment to one position or 
the other was our only option precluded consideration 
that a qualified acceptance of both positions was not only 
possible but reasonable. Inquiry is thwarted and 
dogmatism creeps in when i t is supposed that only one 
point of view Is completely right and that any other is all 
wrong. The mistake that behaviorists make is to conclude 
that because so·calied free will cannot be relfled, man is 
Fl\U. 1976 
therefore not tree, and so is Incapable of choice. What is 
overlooked is that to choose Is to engage in a kind of 
behavior, I.e .. that choice has Its behavioral d imensions. It 
is crucial to add, however, that a "choice" that has been 
predetermined is not a choice at all, for to speak of a "con-
ditioned choice" is to employ mutually contradictory 
language. Thus viewed, selective behavior is not choice i t-
self, nor is it the whole of it; rather, It represents but the 
observable tip or overt culmination of choosing. Whereas 
the existentialist would have us believe that we are always 
confronted with choice, the behaviorist would have us 
believe that we are never free to choose. Why not say that 
we experience some situations In which the possibilities 
for choice are virtually unlimited anel others where they 
are severely restric ted? · 
This suggests that in situations where individuals are 
relatively free to control, lake charge of, or assume 
responsibility for their actions, the term conduct be used, 
and that the generic term behavior be applied in 
describing actions and movements that are merely 
responsive. One does not speak, for example, of atoms, 
worms, hens, dogs, trees or stars as in any sense con-
ducting themselves, tor their behavior Is for the most part 
in response to forces over whic h they have virtually no 
control. Even here, however, ii Is important to add that an 
object itself is as much a determiner of Its behavior as are 
external forces that play upon It. A marble and a wad of 
chewing gum may be placed on th e same inclined plane. 
Both are in the same gravitatio nal field . Yet each responds 
differently. The marble selects to roll, while the wad of 
gum selects to remain in place. Such selectivity is, of 
course, neither conscious, deliberate nor purposeful. It is 
simply i llust rative that the nature of an object itself is as 
much a selector of Its behavior as are the external forces 
to which it responds. Selective ability thus understood is 
characteristic of all forms o f matter; whereas choice 
represents that peculiar refinement of selective ability 
that renders ii reflective and purposeful, and that makes 
possible a realization of foreseeable ends. According ly, in 
so tar as it suggests a significant degree of conscious, 
purposive self-regulation, conduct is a uniquely human 
trail and cannot be applled lo any other form of l i fe or mat-
ter. 
We are often misled Into denying the uniqueness of 
human beings by the argument that their biological and 
physiological equipment Is essentially no different from 
that of their nearest nonhuman relatives, all of which 
display varying degrees of intelligence. But this argument 
misses the point, for the distinctiveness of human beings 
lies not in their physiological equipment but in the 
uniquely human ways in which they are capable of putting 
such equipment to use. As some geneticists maintain, 
human evolution in a strictly biological sense has 
probably run its course, but human evolution in terms of 
the development of moral and social intelligence has 
probably just begun. Mastery of the forces of nature out· 
side us has outstripped our ability to master the forces of 
nature within us. We have succeeded to a terrifying extent 
in controlling our physical environment, but we are only 
beginning to learn the importance of controlling ourselves 
in a moral sense. This means, first. that man 's future 
evolution will likely be in terms of developing and refining 
his intellectual, moral and aesthetic powers; and, sec· 
ondly, that for the first time In human history the course of 
man's future evolution will be within man's collective 
power to control. This is neither an optimistic nor a 
11 
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pessimistic observation, for i t opens up possibilities for 
both dire and beneficent consequences. Impartiall y It 
places the burden of choice in regard to the kind of future 
world man prefers to live in squarely on man's shoulders; 
it places man in charge of his own destiny. Whatever out· 
comes emerge will depend upon how human beings 
choose to conduct themselves, and how they choose 10 
conduct themselves will depend largely upon the k ind of 
education to which we choose to expose them. How, then, 
should education be conceived? 
To ask, Whal are the purposes of education? is to ask 
a meanin gless quest ion, for it assumes that purposes are 
ready-made, lying about, extant, waiting to be discovered. 
A better question to ask would be: In light of past ex· 
perience, present condit ions and fu tu re posslbllltles. how 
shall we best formulate the purposes of education? This is 
a perennial question . It needs to be addressed again and 
again, for as conditions change and as further experience 
is gained, purposes will be correspondingly modified; and 
suitable answers for one generation may be unsuitable for 
the nex t. This Is not to advocate a wishy-washy relativism; 
nor does It mean that whatever ends have served us well in 
the past must be discarded simply because they are not 
new. On the contrary, i i means that no educational Ideal 
can claim exemption from periodic review, and that en· 
during values may as often be found worthy of retention 
as innovations may be found wanting. Whether or not ii 
reflects a paucity of educational thought, the tact Is that 
most recent educational Innovations have appeared in the 
form of teaching and learning devices. What is lost sight 
of when education Is so narrowly conceived is that no 
teaching or learning device is worth its sal t that divorces . 
itself from the ends It Is designed to achieve. Devices are 
by definition means, they are instrumental ities, and so 
they are not sel f·contained but are to be judged only In 
terms of whatever purposes they are meant to serve. 
Behavior manipulation or conditioning cannot be 
faulted on grounds that It doesn' t bring results. Massive 
evidence could be cited to refute such a charge. Indeed, 
much of human history is an account of the conquest for 
control of human thought and human behavior. But 
desired results need to be carefully distinguished from 
results that are truly desirable. What is merely desired 
may be based upon no more than impulse, caprice, habit 
or tradition, to say nothing of self-serving interests; while 
what Is in fact desirable requires enlistment of powers of 
reflec ti on, judgment and evaluation. Awareness of what is 
merely desired Is shared by humans and nonhumans alike; 
but formulation of what is desirable is characteristic only 
of human beings, for It demands choosing among alt er· 
natives In regard to their long-range ind ividual and social 
benefits. 
Preoccupation with fads, devices and gadgetry has 
distracted us from attending to education's more Im-
portant functions. Preoccupation with behavior 
manipulation has deflected our concern from the at· 
tltudes, values and ideals of the learner. As a result, we 
have prized not knowledge, reponslbillty, and un· 
derstandlng but a semblance of them; we have forgotten 
that to live without purpose is not to live in any human 
sense at all. If, with Dewey, we hold that "'the ideal aim of 
education Is creation of power of self·control""-and If 
such aim Is taken seriously rather than as platitude-a 
shift from preoccupation with behavior to concern for 
conduct Is In order. Concem with reflection for its own sake 
divorces thought from i ts practical issue in conduct, while 
12 
exclusive concern with behavior falls to provide for its 
being a culmination of reflection. Although all behavior 
may be regarded as in some sense controlled, that unique 
kind of behavior over which Individuals exercise self· 
control and that is not exclusively shaped by factors ex· 
traneous to themselves is precisely what is meant by con· 
duct. 
use of the term conduct has the advantage of 
distinguishing thoughtful, purposive and morally sen· 
sitive activities from those that are merely accidental or 
habituated. Conduct requires acceptance of responsibility 
for actions deliberate ly undertaken as over against in· 
di fferent and merely responsive kinds of behavior; it 
represents a conjoining of reflec tion with action. In so far 
as self-contro l is not Inborn, It Is a crucial task of 
education to create, nurtu re and develop it in individually 
and socially productive ways. To learn is to grow in 
powers of responsible decision-making ; and to educate is 
to foster utili zation of such powers in the int elligent con· 
duct of life. All skills and knowledge are necessary means 
to this end. 
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